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ABSTRACT: This article critiques the Australian Government’s White
Paper: Australia in the Asian Century. It begins by reflecting on the relationship
between Australia and Asia suggesting that this is measured solely through the
narrow economic lens of Australian interests. The critique then focusses on the
key drivers presented as the means by which Australia will navigate the Asian
century concluding that although Australia punches above its weight in terms of
living standards, equity and social inclusion, the White Paper overstates the
country’s capability and capacity particularly in the areas of skills, education,
innovation and relationship development. This presents a number of unrealistic
expectations, presenting difficulties for the current government to fund the
fundamental initiatives required to deliver on the promises contained in the
document.
KEY WORDS: Australia; Asian Century; White Paper; Asia; China; Economy.

1. INTRODUCTION
The White Paper; Australia in the Asian Century (2012), delivered by
former Australian Treasury figure Ken Henry, was the first fully
elaborated political and strategically focused government document to
present the direction and self-perception of Australia’s position in relation
to the nation’s interests in the Asian region. It was also the most
comprehensive document of its kind since the 1989 “Australia and the
Northeast Asian ascendancy” Garnaut paper, which focused on trade
outcomes with the then emerging East Asian giants.
Though Prime Minister Julia Gillard initially claimed that she lacked
interest in Foreign Affairs, the document she commissioned addressed a
combination of Australian economic assumptions relative to Asian
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economies and provides insights into Australia’s perceived role within
this context. The White Paper, which took one year to complete and
involved over 150 separate consultations, was released in the midst of
global uncertainty, especially with regard to the performance of Asian
economies. It was also a paper that sought to address the oft-used
explanation of China’s role in helping Australia bypass the worst of the
global financial crisis since 2008.
Coincidentally, the White Paper was released in the historic week in
which both the Chinese and US leadership was being decided. The
release of this White Paper also commemorated forty years of diplomatic
relations with China. This could be interpreted as recognition that
Australia’s strategic direction remained firmly tied to markets that are on
the one hand, the centre of global growth and on the other, reliant on
Australia’s mineral commodities.
Certainly, Australia has come a long way since the pre-1945 days when
its destiny was dependent on the United Kingdom (UK) and the
Commonwealth. At that time, not only were more than half of Australia’s
exports bound for the UK (DFAT, 2002) but Australia’s political,
strategic and security direction was also firmly based on this historical
and ongoing relationship. This Anglocentric mindset ultimately
underpinned Australia’s entry into the First (Great) and Second World
Wars, which remain to this day icons of Australia’s national identity. But
Britain’s place in the world would change dramatically after World War
Two and the world would be dominated by the emerging United States
and its Cold War tussle with the former Soviet Union. This vulnerability
forced Australia to rethink security arrangements within its region and the
decisions made at that time have continued to inform security policy as
Australia juggles its international commitments with its aspirations for
regional prosperity (Bull, 1977; Miller, 1966).
While Europe was the theatre of the Cold War in the west, in the Far
East soon after the end of the Second World War, China was the theatre
of a social uprising with the People’s Liberation Army under the
leadership of Mao Tse Tung, creating a new China and setting the stage
for an Asian Cold War. From the early 1950s, much of Australia’s
attention, with its limited military capabilities, was focused on this new
entity’s emergence on the world stage and especially on the ideological
position it represented for regional security. China epitomized a
Communist threat to the region and ultimately to “capitalist” countries in
the area. Australia was positioned as a beacon of the west and a partner of
the new US superpower’s presence in Asia. The political approach at that
time was, therefore, to reject China’s rise and rally against this emerging
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power. Indeed, Australia along with numerous western nations, refused to
even acknowledge the presence of the People’s Republic of China (PRC)
until the Labor government formally recognised it in 1972 (Bull, 1977;
Fullilove and Oliver, 2013). It is worth noting, however, that although
Australia did not formally recognise Communist China before 1972,
Australia did have a strong export relationship with the so-called
“Mainland” China, especially in the area of wheat exports. As a result,
the economic relationship with China is long standing and has not always
been influenced by American policy in the region.
The aim of this paper is to provide a critique of the Government’s
White Paper in a focused analysis of its immediate past and current
context and to discuss and challenge some of the key drivers that
underpin it. We seek to go beyond the somewhat superficial
commentaries previously published on this document to assess the spirit,
tone and veracity of the paper by comparing some of the key future
assessments contained within the paper with available evidence. Through
this process we gauge the likelihood of success of some of the initiatives
foreshadowed in the document and provide a series of conclusions that
we anticipate will open up further debate on Australia’s position in the
Asian Century.
2. THE STRUCTURE OF THE WHITE PAPER
Published in October 2012, the White Paper is a comprehensive
document set out in nine Chapters. Chapter One catalogues the rise of
Asia and is, for the most part, an innocuous historical overview. Chapter
Two discusses Asia's future to 2025, predicting strong economic growth
ahead while highlighting historical rises in gross domestic product (GDP)
across the region. It presents forecasts and projections for the region,
predicting that average economic growth rates will exceed six percent in
many Asian countries particularly China, India, Indonesia, Vietnam and
Malaysia with Thailand lagging a little at about five percent. The White
Paper concedes that productivity is a driver of economic growth and
reminds us that productivity increases in the Australian economy have
declined over the past decade. Chapter two also examines the history of
Australia's engagement within the Asian region going back to the end of
the cold war hostilities with the former Soviet Union. It compliments
Australia for policy change in the development of macroeconomic
frameworks, asserting that the rise of Asia will provide great
opportunities for Australia. A series of charts and graphs, as well as case
studies of Australian manufacturing, are presented to support this
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contention. Despite these pictorial additions, however, the resources
sector maintains a position of prime importance, followed by education,
which is presented as the largest of Australia's services exports. This
claim is based on the number of Asian students studying in Australia,
particularly those from the Association of East Asian Nations (ASEAN)
countries, China and India.
Chapter three discusses Australia in Asia, focusing on developing
institutional connections and what is termed Australia’s economic
integration into Asia as well as regional engagement. Chapter four
discusses Australia’s comparative advantages and the opportunities
arising from Asia’s development. Collectively, these four chapters are
presented as “setting the context for the Asian Century” (p. 4), while the
five chapters that follow (Chapters 5 – 9) present a “roadmap to navigate
the Asian century” (p. 5).
Our analysis begins by reflecting on the relationship between Australia
and Asia (Chapters 1 – 4), suggesting that this is contradictory and
measured solely through the narrow economic lens of Australian
interests. Moreover, we contend that it lacks the essential elements of
trust and commitment that bond ongoing relationships (Morgan and Hunt,
1994). The key intention of this component of our analysis is to examine
the projected direction established for Australia within the White Paper
and to determine whether it is an affirmation of blind faith in the
continued demand for mineral resources or a considered purposeful
direction based on an accurate assessment of the national competencies
and capabilities required to underpin a more mature Australia that can
lead and engage with all of our neighbours in a respectful way regardless
of whether they are major resource consumers.
Following our reflection on the background and context that underpins
the document (Chapters 1-4), we focus on the key drivers contained
within the roadmap that has been presented as the means by which
Australia will navigate the Asian century. The roadmap is underpinned by
Chapters five to nine and the key dimensions of each of these chapters are
presented in Table 1 below. In our analysis we reflect on a number of
these dimensions and present our synopsis of how these are likely to play
out in the Australian/Asian context. Our conclusions are then presented in
the context of the White Paper statement that declares that: “Australia
will be a more prosperous and resilient nation, fully part of the region and
open to the world” (p. 5).
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Table 1. Roadmap to Navigate the Asian Century.
Chapter 5

Chapter 6

Chapter 7

Chapter 8

Chapter 9

• skills and

• schools

• tapping into

• security has

• effective

education

• innovation
• infrastructure
• tax reform
• regulatory
reform

• universities

regional
opportunities

• vocational training • linking with
value chains

• participation
• Asia-capable
leaders and
institutions

• starting at
home

• working in
the region

• environmental

• adaptability

sustainability

• macroeconomic
and financial
frameworks

• fair, multicultural
and cohesive
society

underpinned
Asia’s
development

• changing
security
environment

• building trust

diplomacy

• stronger and
more
comprehensive
relationships

• closer peopleto people links

• comprehensive • vibrant cultural
national,
collective and
human
security

connections

Source: Adapted from Australia in the Asian Century White Paper.

3. THE MINERALS DISCOVERY – AUSTRALIAN LUCK AND
OBSESSION
Until the 1960s Australia’s primary industry was concentrated around
agricultural products and wool. With the war rationing system still in
place until the early 1950s, there was a need for food to feed a population
that was increasing at a rapid rate. Indeed, the birth rate in Australia in
the 1950s doubled from that of the 1930s (Butlin et al., 1982) and this
natural population increase was further boosted by migration programs
designed to assist with post war reconstruction. As a result, “…from 1947
to 1971 the annual rate of [population] growth was 2.2 percent, though it
slowed from 1972 to 1979 to 1.3 percent … and 1.5 percent in 1982 …
(Betts, 1984, p.48).
At the same time, Australia was a small, late developer in
manufacturing and its services industry was internally focused,
concentrating mainly on short terms needs. As a result, agriculture and
wool in their own respective ways offered important economic
opportunities for Australia’s international trade profile. The Korean War,
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for example, drove the demand for wool and, as a result, the price of wool
reached historic highs. Australia also consolidated its markets for
agricultural products within the UK and beyond. The mineral wealth that
now dominates Australia’s economy remained hidden beneath the soil
until the 1960s (Mascitelli and Tinney, 2012).
Even during the period of the Whitlam government (1972-75), and
especially after its fall in 1975, Australia displayed a split personality in a
real politic game in which relations with China were encouraged because
they supported Australian economic interests but were always tempered
by security concerns. This is reflected in its approach to Taiwan, human
rights, and a hard line stance that mirrors the US hard power approach
(Wang, 2012). This contradictory approach is still inherent in Australia’s
White Paper aspirations which are based on an expectation that China
will continue its agenda of state de-regulation, privatisation, and the
dismantling of “socialist foundations”. Within the White Paper, the
opening up of the Chinese economy appears to be linked to political
democratisation, indicating that the Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989
and the annihilation of the democratisation movement will not reoccur. In
reality, it would seem that the enriched middle class, which is the driver
of emerging wealth, and the upper class in China, are content that the
current political leadership still best represents its interests. Can it be
assumed that this state of affairs will necessarily last? As long as China’s
interests are in line with the nationalist will of the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP), this is likely to continue. But growing levels of corruption
and the personal enrichment of members of the political elite may reach
breaking point. The arrest of Bo Xia Lai, for instance, may be the “tip of
the iceberg” and, if so, other cases could provoke an internal reaction and
party conflict. How the bureaucracy reacts to retain political and
economic power within the party under such circumstances remains to be
seen, but it would be unwise to assume it would not be forceful and
repressive. Certainly, the personal wealth accumulated by the families of
previous and current party leaders appears to be eroding credibility for a
party that preaches equality and care for the people (Barboza and
LaFraniere, 2012; He, 2012).
4. EFFECTIVE DIPLOMACY OR DIPLOMATIC BARN DANCE?
THE OUTLOOK FOR TRADE WITH ASIA
Although Australian trade, especially in relation to exports, is currently
dominated by Asian markets, the UK was the main trading partner from
Federation in 1901 until it was replaced by Japan in the 1960s. China’s
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economic emergence on the world stage in the post 2000 years was even
more important for Australia than was Japan’s post war reconstruction
with its subsequent effect on Australia in the 1950s and 60s. Japan in the
post-war recovery period was also hungry for Australian resources
particularly coal and iron ore but Japans economic slowdown saw it
replaced by China in 2009. Table 2 below shows how Australian trade
with china has grown between 1980 and 2012. Table 3 shows foreign
direct investment in Australia (FDI). These figures show that Australia’s
investment in China is upwards of $A8.3 billion and Chinese investment
in Australia is around $A16.7 billion (DFAT Fact sheet 2013).
But does Australia’s trade with the three top markets in Asia actually
translate to these “stronger, more comprehensive relationships” (p.25) as
the White Paper suggests, and are our Asian neighbours also our closest
allies and partners? The answer is probably not and for many Australian
businesses the dictum is “business for the sake of business”. In other
words, you do not have to like your trading partner in order to do
business with them let alone develop long term relationships with them.
In both the United States and Australia, there has been much
commentary about China assuming a more, assertive approach to
international affairs and engagement with both of these countries. In the
case of Australia, the focus has been on Chinese investment in agriculture
and in mining, while in the US, the concern is about the power and might
of China and its influence on the control of US government debt. The
failed attempt by the Chinese Chinalco corporation to buy into Rio Tinto
in 2009 and recent expressions of interest by Chinese investors to buy out
Australian cotton producer, Cubbie Station, led to cries of “selling out the
farm” from politicians such as Barnaby Joyce and others. Nevertheless,
Australia has, with the exception of the telecommunications Huawei case,
by and large avoided scare mongering against China. Indeed, the
Huawei’s exclusion from bidding for the Australian National Broad Band
Network (NBN), reconfirmed by the Abbott government in July 2013,
surprised many given the special trade relationship between China and
Australia. What makes the case even more surprising is the fact that the
Managing Director of Huawei is a former Admiral of the Australian Navy
and its Australian board includes reputable Australian politicians such as
former Victorian Premier John Brumby and former Foreign Affairs
Minister and leader of the Liberal Party of Australia, Alexander Downer.
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Table 2. Australian Exports to Principal Markets 1980-1981 to 20122013

USA
UK
China

1980-1981
($b)
2.1
0.700
0.976

1990-1991
($b)
5.7
1.8
2.8

2000-2001
($b)
11.6
4.6
10.7

2012-2013
($b)
9.0
5.5
78.0

Source: DFAT (2002)

Table 3. Direct Foreign Investment in Australia

Source: NSW Government (2011).

Consequently, “setting the context” in terms of the manner in which
Australia has developed relationships within the region, is not as positive
as the White Paper portrays. Granted, in the White Paper Ms Gillard
cautions that “… predicting the future is fraught with risk, but the greater
risk is in failing to plan for our destiny” (p. ii). If Australia's destiny is to
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exploit the Asian region as a market for Australian goods and services,
then this White Paper captures that spirit. But seizing the economic
opportunities that will flow from this era will not be as simple as
documenting Australia’s aspirations in a White Paper. An editorial in the
Australian Financial Review aptly captured this contradiction: “Australia
has built its economic settings on a Chinese growth model which may not
be sustainable” (Australian Financial Review, 2013). Along with the
growing middle classes in the Asian region is a growing level of
confidence that is driving a global mindset among Asian citizens to a
point where they now envisage a world beyond the region. This is evident
in patterns of outbound tourism (Turner, 2012). At the same time Europe
and North America are vying to improve their own opportunities by
creating bilateral trade agreements within the Asian region. Like
Australia, these nations seek to capitalise on the potential of this large
emerging, economic powerhouse. Australia, therefore, is but one player in
the region, and as is the case in contemporary business practice, when
faced with intense competition businesses seek to develop long term
relationships based on trust and commitment (Fullerton, 2005; O’Mahony
et al., 2013).
While the Labor Government believed that Australia would benefit
from a track record of engagement with the nations of the region, when
describing Australia's principal relationships within Asia the White Paper
lists China, India, Indonesia, Japan and the Republic of Korea. Within the
same section of the White Paper, it is noted that Australia's alliance with
the United States remains as strong as ever, highlighting some notional
link with the US in Australia's Asian relationship. This dilutes the concept
of a principal relationship between Australia and our Asian neighbours,
limiting trust and the commitment required to develop lasting, meaningful
relationships. Indeed, recent scholarly work would suggest that our
alliance with the US is not sustainable, which has significant implications
for our relations with China and indeed with our other Asian neighbours.
For example, White (2013) asserts that the Australian approach towards
the US and its related approach in Asia and especially towards China,
underscores an Australian “… assumption … that America knows what
it’s doing with China, and will do what’s best. This goes hand in hand
with the assumption that Australia has no choice but to support American
primacy in Asia against the threat of Chinese hegemony. Both these
assumptions now need to be challenged” (White, 2013, p. 13).
Recent concern from China about the new Australian Abbott
government and its “harder line” foreign policy in relation to China does
little to improve this perception (Murray and Grigg, 2013). Leaving aside
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the political back-patting permeating this one and a half page foreword,
this opening statement fails to convince the reader that the White Paper is
indeed “… focused on fairness… ”(p. iii). Most readers would consider
this section of the document to be somewhat immodest, verging on
arrogant, with an added hint of threat in the form of Australia's
relationship with the US. This view would appear to be shared by Asian
observers. Murray Hunter wrote in the Jakarta Post on 30 October 2012,
For example:
“The paper … reeks of Austro-centrism where most of
the points made in the document are written with the
expectation that Australia will win out with closer ties
with Asia without necessarily giving much back in
exchange — such as Australia having closer ties with
Asian universities in order to attract students and skilled
workers. Rather one–way to say the least” (Hunter,
2012).
Hunter is sceptical of Australia’s claim to be a competitive force in the
region explaining that first it must have an accepted place in the region.
This belies the documents emphasis on stronger and more comprehensive
relationships as well as vibrant cultural connections. It is even more
worrying when, in chapter five, the relationship element is presented as
“… enabling closer economic and social integration across the Asian
region …” (p. 134).
It should be noted, however, that the White Paper has a three stage
implementation timeline (which is presented in Chapters 5 to 9). The first
stage, described on pages 134 and 135, is to be completed by 2013 and
this stage is a consultation phase in which the Government seeks to
promote and facilitate discussion through a series of State by State
consultation fora. The second stage, which runs from 2014 to 2018, as
described on pages 24 and 25, will concentrate on building a deeper
understanding and relationships within the region and seeks to develop
broader economic integration and connectivity. Stage three (presented on
page 252) runs from 2019 to 2025 and this final stage is designed to focus
on ensuring Australia becomes fully part of the region across all levels of
society, business, government and the community (Burgess, 2013). Thus,
we see some acknowledgement in this implementation regime that there
is still some work to be done in the area of relationship development.
Nevertheless, the focus on an emerging wealthy and mobile middleclass is correct and, within this context, no doubt the demand for
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Australian goods and services will increase. The areas noted in the White
Paper where Australia will reap the benefits of this emerging middle
class, include health, aged care, education, household goods, tourism,
banking and financial services, as well as high quality food products.
Market intelligence would suggest that some of these are indeed growth
areas, for example; the emphasis on high quality food is already showing
signs of strong demand within the region (Monk et al., 2012). Australia’s
role in the provision of services such as health and aged care, however, is
not as easily understood particularly since many Asian countries are
already capitalising on health care in the form of medical tourism and
many Australians are abandoning the national medical system to take
advantage of low cost elective procedures, cosmetic surgery and dentistry
in the region (Connell, 2006).
5. AUSTRALIAN EDUCATION AND PRODUCTIVITY IN THE
ASIAN CENTURY
The White Paper’s ambitions for national education (first outlined on
page 2), from early childhood to tertiary education, are acknowledged as
forming the building blocks to access the benefits of the Asian Century.
Recent Government reports, however, including the much publicised
Gonski report, have concluded that our schools are failing in many of the
basics but especially in language, literacy and numeracy (Gonski Report,
2011). School reform is required across the entire system and that system
is charged with the aim of placing Australia in the top five schooling
systems in the world by 2025. At the same time many of our Asian
neighbours (the Shanghai region of China, South Korea, Singapore and
Hong Kong) already have a world class school system. The White Paper
also accepts that in the Shanghai region of China, the average 15 year old
student is performing two to three years ahead of their counterparts in
Australia or conversely Australian 15 year olds are two to three years
behind.
Moreover, much of the political discussion relative to the 41
recommendations contained within the Gonski report has centred on the
funding required to implement those recommendations. There is general
agreement that the implementation of the Gonksi recommendations will
require billions of dollars in investment. The Labor Government indicated
its intention to claw $2.8 billion out of the higher education system to
fund schools, thus reducing the quality of education in that sector. This
has invoked the ire of members of the Gonski panel, who see the
education sector as one system rather than the three component parts of
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primary, secondary and tertiary education. Thus removing funding from
one area to fund another undermines the overall system. While this might
suggest that the educational aspirations in the White Paper are beyond our
means, school performance in the area of languages is even less
promising. Australia’s first ambassador to China, Stephen Fitzgerald has
described Labor’s promise of providing Asian language classes for every
school student as a delusion. More importantly, he goes on to state that
understanding China, in particular, requires a high capacity in the Chinese
language and scoffs at the idea in the White Paper that all school pupils
will have access to one priority Asian language (Lane, 2013).
This being the case, the cultural and structural changes destined to
occur within our school system under the White Paper are unlikely to be
achieved. Indeed, the provision of the foundations required to attempt to
deliver on these promises requires an enormous, long-term financial
commitment which, when added to the cost of the proposed education
reform agenda, will represent a staggering funding investment with little
assurance of a return on that investment.
The White Paper also acknowledges that Vocational or Technical and
Further Education (TAFE) has a major role to play in creating the
conditions for businesses to boost productivity (see page 17). Thus,
TAFE is an important support structure because it is here that we develop
our trade skills base and provide workers with the training and
development programs that positively impact on productivity. The
vocational sector is a state government prerogative, however, and in
Victoria, the nation’s manufacturing capital, TAFE has been stripped of
funding leading to campus closures and the abandonment of many
programs of study. Regional providers have been particularly hard hit.
While gaps in provision are likely to be taken up through cut-price private
provision, this will be at the expense of quality, particularly in the
provision of ancillary services such as libraries and student support.
These cuts in TAFE have been replicated across other States including
Queensland and New South Wales. Thus, it remains to be seen whether
any productivity gains will accrue to businesses reliant on this system for
their training and development needs.
The White Paper’s aspirations for Higher Education are positive.
However, few in that sector would be happy to read about further reform
as they grapple to absorb the deregulation of university places for local
students and to mitigate a major downturn in international student
enrolments. The removal of a cap on University places has already seen
some universities struggle to fill classrooms and others to set the entry
criteria so low it is difficult to see how this will build the capabilities

552

Mascitelli and O’Mahony

described in Chapter Six of the White Paper. Having 10 Australian
universities in the top 100 worldwide by 2025 is an aspiration that may be
possible to achieve depending on the indices used to measure success.
For example, the QS Times ranking is more generous than the Academic
Ranking of World Universities (ARWU) and the general view is that the
latter is the only one that matters. With five Australian Universities
currently in the ARWU top 100 (as of 2012), achieving the goals set out
in the White Paper will require major research funding because top 100
status is predominantly measured in terms of research quality. This has
now been undermined by the announcement that an already cash poor
system is to absorb further major cuts making it among the least funded
higher education systems in the western world. As Iain Martin reported in
the Australian Financial Review… “just to maintain Australia’s standing
in the global ranking probably requires a two percent annual
improvement in performance, something that a 2 percent funding cut and
increasingly intrusive legislation will hardly facilitate” (Martin, 2013,
p.55).
Nevertheless, given that most research funding goes to the Group of
Eight (Go8) universities, getting more of these universities up to the top
100 standard by 2025 would seem feasible, if significant additional
research funding was provided. Currently a number of the five research
hubs highlighted in the White Paper, which are funded collaborations
with the CSIRO, are already working with Go8 universities. More
important than how many Australian universities are ranked in the
World’s top 100 rankings, however, are the benefits that are expected to
accrue from this achievement. Among these are the development of
capability within Australia, the attraction of international students from
Asia to Australia and the development, through the five aforementioned
research hubs, of commercial, innovative spin-off companies and
products, particularly in the area of biotechnology.
Dealing firstly with the former, while boasting ten of the top 100
universities might be seen as positive, how this is to translate into a major
opportunity for Australia is unclear. Firstly, although achieving research
funding and increasing research can improve international rankings; this
does not necessarily translate into better learning and teaching within
universities. In fact, there are many who believe that the concentration on
research leads to lower teaching standards. As a result, the link between
top 100 universities and building capability among graduates is spurious.
Indeed, this is more likely to increase elitism within Australian society
which has the potential to undermine any perceived benefits. Secondly, if
further research funding is to be diverted to Go8 universities there will be
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less available to the other 32 universities, with a subsequent negative
impact on learning and teaching. These are hardly the conditions that will
attract international students from the Asian region to Australia in great
numbers. Thus far, attempts to reinvigorate the international student
market, which was decimated by a combination of poor policy, an
overreaction to the opportunistic behaviour of some Registered Training
Organisations (RTOs) and the high Australian dollar, have failed. The
introduction of the recommendations of the Knight Review have yielded
little or no improvement and the competitive edge granted to the US,
Canada and New Zealand in the interim have reduced Australia’s market
share. Of more concern is that once these alternative options become
established, just like trade routes of the past, it is difficult to change
behaviour. At the same time, major increases in the cost of living, for
example - such as increases in electricity prices - means that those
receiving scholarships in their home currencies (as do many Thai,
Malaysian and Indonesian students) find it difficult to survive and this
undermines many of the predicted benefits of Australia's close position to
Asia.
At the same time, universities within Asia are developing their own
capability, with major investments across the region. Malaysia has
upgraded many of its institutions to university status, as has Indonesia.
There has been a move to send university academics from these countries
overseas to achieve doctoral qualifications to support these upgrades but
we are now seeing more universities in the region supporting their
cohorts of higher education teachers and researchers by bringing in
eminent professorial staff to mentor and guide them within their own
institutions. This means that scholarship funding to study overseas will
decrease and students will be encouraged to study in their own countries.
Moreover, changes to curriculum in Europe under the Bologna agreement
have not gone unnoticed in the Asian region. ASEAN, for example;
which includes Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines,
Singapore, Brunei, Vietnam, Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia are shaping
up to be a powerful, integrated union within South East Asia. This has the
potential to negatively impact Australia’s ambitions in education and in
tourism. For example, ASEAN is currently developing a common core
within the higher educational curriculum so that transferability within
ASEAN nations can be seamlessly achieved. This means that students
can add travel and an international dimension to their studies in much the
same way that the Bologna agreement operates within Europe. These
developments do not validate the White Paper’s suggestion that
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universities in Australia would be a major beneficiary of increasing
wealth in Asia.
The White Paper predicts growth in a number of areas where Australia
has export opportunities - such as agriculture, finance, mining and other
services. While it is most likely that many of these, mainly private sector,
businesses, will gain significant returns on shareholder investment, the
same may not be the case for Australian taxpayers. In the following
sections two important areas that are predicted in the White Paper to yield
significant returns to Australia are examined. These are biotechnology
and tourism. Australia’s ambitions in biotechnology (first mentioned on
page 124 of the White Paper) may also be difficult to achieve. The
biotechnology industry grew out of university-based research and was
supported by large companies. The industry therefore relies on strong
functioning networks to flourish. A comprehensive study into the
biotechnology industry in Australia, however, found that the ‘tyranny of
distance’ along with a dependence on external support for ideas, start-up
money and taking products to market was a major barrier to this industry
(Gilding, 2008). The study further found that there are few countries
where distance is more of an issue, that relationships with universities
were limited and that the key players in the industry were located
offshore. As a result, the benefits from biotechnology to Australia, if
indeed these were to be realised, are more likely to accrue to large,
overseas-based companies. As a CEO interviewed for the study put it, if
anybody “… thinks he is going to take Australian technology, and
develop it in Australia using Australian researchers, never moving
outside the country, […] is a fool …” (Gilding, 2008, p.1143). With a key
biotechnology hub already established in Singapore, the aims of the
White Paper in the development of this industry are unlikely to be
attained.
As noted on pages 40 and 97 of the White Paper, tourism is another key
service industry that is expected to underpin Australia’s economy within
the Asian century. However, this industry also suffers from the tyranny of
distance in that international tourist arrivals are invariably “long- haul
tourists” (an industry term that denotes distance travelled). The
Australian tourism industry has experienced peaks and troughs in demand
along with crises, shocks, pandemics and natural disasters. Although a
vulnerable industry, it is expected to grow (Rifai, 2011; Yeoman, 2008)
particularly in the Asian Pacific region where a 6.5 percent annual
increase is predicted to 2020 (WTO, 2001). Within the White Paper,
capturing the Asian market appears to be based mainly on advertising
tourism, which is an expensive strategy particularly when Tourism
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Australia, which manages these campaigns, has been criticised in the past
for missing the mark with its advertising. The Lara Bingle, “where the
bloody hell are you?” campaign is one example. Curiously, Tourism
Australia’s more recent promotions have included heavy investment in
the Australian movie industry as well as attracting Oprah Winfrey and
Ellen DeGeneres to host their shows in Australia. These initiatives
provide significant television exposure for Australia. Nonetheless, the
audience is mainly American and Australia does not host American
tourists in large numbers. At the same time, future tourist arrivals from
Europe are forecasted to either decrease or weakly increase in the next
few years and current forecasts would suggest that tourism to Australia
from most Asian countries is likely to decline from 2014 (Turner, 2012).
Table 4 shows the forecasted outbound tourism Average Annual
Growth Rate from a number of Asian countries to 2014. As well as where
they are expected to go. The table shows America will gain most from
Asian outbound tourism with Australia (which is grouped within the
Pacific region) reliant mainly on Chinese travellers. Within what is
shaping up to be a competitive market, it is difficult to see the link
between the Chinese traveller and American TV shows as suggesting that
a more focussed strategy will be required to reap the benefits of the Asian
Century for Australian tourism. Moreover, given that Australia’s tourism
eggs are firmly in one basket then, the relationship with China is crucial
to its success.
Table 4. A Comparison of Average Annual Growth Rate (AAGR)
Percentage of Outgoing Travellers from East Asia and India
Americas

Asia

Pacific

Chinese travellers

16.04

12.62

11.27

Taiwanese Travellers

0.67

1.85

0.26

Hong Kongese Travellers

3.25

1.49

1.99

Japanese Travellers

0.39

3.34

-8.07

Korean Travellers

4.17

6.32

-3.09

Indian Travellers

3.39

9.43

3.64

Source: Turner (2012).
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6. WHAT THE WHITE PAPER SAYS AND WHAT IT DOES NOT
With over 350 pages of carefully crafted phrases the document brings
together Australia’s current economic reality with China and presents this
with an excess of fanciful spin and expectations for the future. The
document acknowledges the pace of GDP growth across China, India,
Korea and other Asian countries, omitting Japan, no doubt due to its
struggling economy and disappointing economic predictions over the
coming years. The White Paper has made the assumption that economic
growth rates can continue into 2025 based on the last ten years of growth.
Many observers are less confident that both China and India can sustain
these high growth rates. Some of the processes that drove the economic
growth of these economies are no longer present and the global economic
crisis that erupted in 2008 continues to rock Europe, the United States
and Japan, Asia’s principal markets. This is taking its toll on global
growth rates and especially growth rates in key Asian markets. World
Bank data and forecasts for 2012 indicate that the Asian economies
excluding Japan and India will be 7.2 percent, down from 8.3 percent in
2011. China is expected to grow by just 7.7 percent, compared to 9.3
percent last year. Indian growth will be about 6 percent, down from more
than 8 percent.
Australia is seen as fortunate to be in the vicinity of these economic
powerhouses which, for now, continue to access Australian resources. As
a result, Australia finds itself in a privileged position, but it would be fair
to say that this is not based on carefully crafted relationships rather it is
another manifestation of Australia’s status as “the Lucky Country”.
Demand for minerals has driven the Australian economy and allowed
Australia to survive the global financial crisis, thus far, without recession.
While mining continues to comprise about two thirds of Australia’s
exports to Asia, and even more so to China, there are some bumps on the
horizon, which according to Rowan Callick in the The Australian, the
Labor Government had chosen to overlook. The mining boom in its iron
ore centrality is no longer reliable and, according to some pundits, is
slowly declining. Callick asserts that:
“… the Labor government ignored warnings of China’s
economic slowdown and that recent economic data on
China’s economy has been overlooked because Canberra
has placed China firmly in the frame for our economic
woes, its slowing is portrayed as an utterly expected
event” (Callick, 2013, p.24).
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But the White Paper argues that once this boom has passed, Australia
must become more competitive selling other goods and services to
affluent Asia, such as food, education, health and financial services.
Clearly the author of the White Paper, Ken Henry, wants Australia to
jettison the “dismal thinking of the past” and also the tyranny of distance
from its old partners in Europe and America, and to “embrace its
geography” creating major markets for Australian goods closer to home.
In Australia, much commentary and criticism has been levelled at the
shortcomings of the White Paper mainly based on a lack of commitment
to providing the financial resources to fund the initiatives presented
within the document. Former Victorian Premier Ted Ballieu directly
attacked the Labor government for “… inconsistency in its statements of
support for greater engagement with Asia but then cutting the budget for
trade officials and export grants” (Dunckley and Earl 2012, p. 6) and for
reneging on a commitment to opening Embassies and Consulates
throughout Asian countries. The recent cuts to higher education are
another example, of a schizophrenic, naive view that improvements can
be made without funding. Another damning criticism is the extent to
which narrower Labor government policies permeate the White Paper
departing from the bipartisan approach of past White Papers. While the
White Paper has reaffirmed the US at the centre of the regions security
axis, at the same time it dismisses the key economic roles which both the
US and the European economies play in maintaining a strong Australian
economy. Little mention is made of the key role which American and
British investment play in growing the Australian economy.
The White Paper, therefore, which was intended to be a visionary
statement, seems to contain little of that. It sees Australia’s economic
advantage yet again as a minerals in the ground seller, a product of luck
and fortune blowing in the winds of fate rather than a country endowed
with any particular leadership, vision or talent to navigate the Asian
Century. The report positions Australia as an outsider in a distant
relationship with Asia bereft of trust or commitment. The framework
presented is built around exploiting its mineral wealth as a seller in good
times as the Asian tiger economies continue to grow rapidly. What the
document fails to tackle is the strong possibility that the world will not
remain positioned in a manner to benefit Australia. During the 1970s and
1980s Japan was a significant player in Australian economic life but
withdrew in the 1990s due to the collapse of the Japanese economy.
There is little reason to think that China could not respond in the same
way. The report also fails to acknowledge competition from other
western countries particularly the US and Europe who are also vying for
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Asian business, creating trade agreements, trading blocs and no doubt
developing their own White Papers to support them. Equally, if not more
worrying, is recent speculation about economic decline among Asian
economies. UBS senior economic advisor George Magnus has publicly
posited the question “Is the Asia miracle over?” In his view “slightly
slower growth and relatively disappointing equity returns over the last 18
months should be of fleeting concern” (Asia Today International 2012, p.
8). Although the Japanese economy currently appears to be returning to
growth, being dependent upon more monetary easing may mean that this
growth is not sustained. Australia can benefit from economic
improvements in Japan. Indeed, Japanese investment in Australia has
gradually increased over the last two decades into a diverse portfolio that
includes Toyota, Paper Australia (in 2009), and Dairy Farmers (Joint
Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, defence and Trade, 2013). This
suggests that two-way trade relationships, such as that which is
foreshadowed in the Australia/Japan free trade agreement currently under
negotiation, are likely to be more enduring than the one way trade flows
suggested in the White Paper.
7. HAUNTED BY PAST LEGACIES
The overly optimistic view of the White Paper has also been criticised
in a comment entitled “Dark side of white paper”, by Australian
Financial Review commentator Geoffrey Barker, who noted that: “The
white paper sees but does not stress the dark side of international
relations. Security is hardly mentioned until the eighth chapter and the
tone stays determinedly optimistic.” Barker lists the potential triggers for
conflict including a clash between the US and China, noting that “neither
trade and financial integration, nor economic independence” prevented
the outbreak of the First World War.
The best judge of how Australia is viewed in the region comes from the
region. Building on his comments noted earlier, Hunter’s observations
from Indonesia take on a sarcastic note:

Australia in the Asian Century – a Critique of the White Paper

559

“After decades of successive government foreign
and trade policy, Australia still does not have any
embedded position within the region. The influence
of Australian business and financial institutions in
the region is minor, nowhere near the critical mass
needed to become a competitive force in the region.
The only exception is in the mining sector, which
to all intents and purposes has made the Australian
economy very dependent upon demand in Asia,
particularly China” (Hunter, 2012).
For at least 40 years policymakers here have grappled with the
chapter’s groundwork on how to focus Australia more closely on Asia.
Over that time, Europe’s dominant place in immigration has waned.
Seven Asian countries figured among Australia’s top ten sources of
migration in 2011-12. India and China occupied first and second place
respectively and mandarin has replaced Italian and Greek as the most
commonly spoken languages in Australia after English. Cultural hurdles
linger in the path of the white paper’s aspirations for closer Asian
integration. A survey by Certified Practicing Accountants (CPA)
Australia, an accounting body, found that Australian businesses (except
mining and farming) typically rate Asian markets less important than
domestic ones. Australia, it says, risks being a spectator rather than a
player in the Asian Century.
In the 1990s, Prime Minister Paul Keating stated that Australia was part
of Asia and made a concerted effort to embed Australia within the region.
However many of these gains have been perceived to have been lost
when John Howard came to power in 1996, reaffirming the CanberraWashington link and in so doing, earning the label for Australia as the
US’s deputy sheriff in Asia. Australia’s relationship within the region, as
presented in the White Paper, is one where Australia needs the region
more than the region needs Australia. The Australian market is small
compared to other markets and of little interest to regional exporters who
prefer to put their efforts into the larger markets like China, Japan, the
European Union and the US. White Papers aside, therefore, it is action
and not words that will be important in realising the White Paper agenda
and China and the region will be surprised to see any real change in
Australia’s outlook, despite the emphasis in Chapter Nine of the White
Paper on relationship development, “closer people to people links” and
“vibrant cultural connections”.
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One of the paramount barriers that must be overcome is the deep set
belief that Australia’s cultural values are not necessarily universally
accepted across the region. In other words, it’s not simply about learning
Asian languages but about understanding different points of view,
approaches, and “mindsets”. Austro-centrism must, therefore, take a back
seat in relationships around the region for Australia to be seriously
considered a member of the region.
In this respect, the White Paper is still haunted by Australia’s past.
Maybe it’s time for Australia to climb out from under the US security
blanket and become a mature and independent nation within the Asian
region. However, one fears that the emphasis on the promise of a rise in
real income from the “Asian Century” initiative, suggests the document
has been developed to pander to the domestic electorate. More worrying
is the fact that, within the White Paper, Asia is seen only as a means for
income levels in Australia to become among the top 10 per-capita
incomes in the world. Under these circumstances therefore, the White
Paper is positioned as a promissory note to be cashed in for a better future
within Australia at some later stage in the Asian Century, this based upon
the misconception that internal capacity building will make Australia
more competitive in Asia. Thus the opportunity to “come of age” and
develop a real strategy to engage within the region would appear to have
been lost, a position that is confirmed by The Economist as follows:
Ms Gillard steered clear of the white paper’s views on a
key issue occupying foreign-policy: how Australia
should manage any conflict between America, its closest
strategic ally, and China, its biggest trading partner.
Australia, the paper says, welcomes China’s rise and
accepts that its military growth is a “natural, legitimate
outcome of its growing economy and broadening
interests”; any cold-war-type containment of China
would not work. A recent poll by the Lowy Institute, a
think-tank, found a majority of Australians do not see
China as a likely military threat (The Economist, 2012).
8. SECURITY CONCERNS
The White Paper devotes a chapter to strategic considerations, noting in
particular that Australia “will work with the United States to ensure it
continues to have a strong and consistent presence in the region.” It
points out that the economic emergence of China and India has the
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potential to generate tensions and rivalries and that the many regional
flashpoints create “the danger of miscalculation and accident”. But it
dismisses the danger of war, by declaring that “Beijing and Washington
both want to develop constructive relations and avoid conflict: their
governments have consistently said so.”
The document reaffirms Australia’s loyalty to the United States and
hints at the historic role of the US as Australia’s saviour. There has been a
total commitment from successive Australian governments through the
Cold War until the present time to US foreign policy as a result of US
military aid in World War II. This has come at the loss of Australia’s
individual identity in Southeast Asia. In contrast, China is now so
important to Australian trade, investment, and tourism that Australia
could be in danger of being ignored by China as a result of its staunch
loyalty to the US. Since Prime Minister Gillard’s 2013 visit to China,
however, there has been a change in Government rhetoric, which Kerin
reports “as part of its softer line on China…”. Kerin believes that there is
a move away from the government’s defence strategy, articulated in the
white paper and that the Government is expected “… to assert that
Australia does not have to choose between its security guarantor, the
United States and its biggest trading partner China” (Kerin, 2013, p. 5).
No doubt China would prefer to deal with an Australia with a mature
and independent foreign policy rather than an enthusiastic promoter of
US foreign policy. In essence, Australia needs to decide whether the ties
that bind will be geographic and based on developing unconditional
relationships or hark back to yesteryear. Perhaps Australia can learn from
the Indonesian approach of dynamic equilibrium, a doctrine where
Washington and Beijing would agree to co-exist rather than compete for
supremacy in the Asian region. These issues were extremely sensitive for
the Gillard government, a point that was underscored in the Australian
which reported that the Labour Government took the extraordinary step
of ordering a major, last-minute rewrite of the White Paper by Allan
Gyngell, from the Office of National Assessments. This key intelligence
agency was apparently consulted because of concerns about the original
draft, because it had “initially overlooked the continuing role of the US in
the region”. Gyngell, it was reported, was called in to assist in making the
document palatable to Washington. The omission was not accidental. By
emphasising the economic imperatives confronting Australian capitalism,
the White Paper necessarily focussed on its most dynamic economic
partnerships, which lie in Asia, above all in China, and not with the
United States (although it is acknowledged that the US is still our biggest
source of FDI). Yet it would appear that Australian-Asian relations are, to
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some degree, threatened by Washington’s drive to maintain a dominant
position in the region at the direct expense of China (Fullilove and Oliver,
2013). Some among Australia’s business elite appear to agree with this
view and are cynical of the government’s espoused priorities in relation to
trade and the development of relationships in the region. As a result, they
have determined to develop their own alliances especially with China.
Casino mogul James Packer for example recently lambasted Australian
policy makers for continuing to define China through the eyes of the cold
war (Kitney, 2012). His view was supported by other Australian business
personalities such as Kerry Stokes, whose main concern was the harsh
opposition towards certain Chinese investment proposals in Australia and
antagonism from certain conservative politicians such as Barnaby Joyce,
suggesting a lack of trust in Australian-Asian relationships.
Far from being a roadmap to a century of peace and prosperity,
therefore, the document’s glaring omissions underline the precarious
position of Australian capitalism as it attempts to straddle the growing
strategic antagonism between the US and China, while at the same time
struggling to keep economically buoyant as Europe and the US slowly
recovery from the global economic crisis. Insofar as the White Paper
outlines a strategy, it is to assist Australian businesses to become evermore “internationally competitive”.
9. CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS
Our conclusion centres on whether “Australia will be a more prosperous
and resilient nation, fully part of the region and open to the world”
(Gillard p. 5). Given the polarity between Australia’s history within the
region and that which is portrayed within the White Paper, one could be
tempted to conclude that Australia is schizophrenic. Certainly history
would suggest that, on many occasions, Australia has perceived its
location as a geographical constraint and that there is another place where
it would rather be. Australia has, for the most part, perceived itself to be a
western nation, with western values captured within an Asian perimeter
and relationships have neither been longstanding nor friendly. It is also
important to remember that Australia has only recently disengaged from
the cold war framework of Asia and embraced an economic opportunities
approach to relationship development within the region. However, as a
new-world country Australia has made its mark on the global scene in a
relatively short time and is now commanding global attention for its
economic prosperity in trying financial times. This critique suggests that
there is still much work to be done in relationship development and to
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progress Australia’s’ standing in the region so that future engagement is
based on trust and friendship rather than purely economic imperatives.
It is important to acknowledge that Australia punches above its weight
in terms of living standards, equity and social inclusion and these are the
values that make a difference. Thus, Australia in the Asian Century must
emerge as a regional leader using its position to bring nations together,
share in regional success and promote the very values that have placed
this nation in this unique and enviable position. The White Paper fails to
deliver on this potential, overstating capability and capacity, particularly
in the areas of skills, education, innovation and relationship development
and presents a number of unrealistic expectations with little or no
apparent intention to fund the fundamental initiatives required to deliver
on the promises contained in the document.
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